Thursday, May 28, 2015

For iPhone, iPad privacy, here's how to turn on encryption in just one minute

For iPhone, iPad privacy, here's how to turn on encryption in just one minute | ZDNet

For iPhone, iPad privacy, here's how to turn on encryption in just one minute

If the feds ever come looking for your iPhone or iPad data, they won't go knocking on Apple's door. They'll be coming straight to you.

Since the introduction of iOS 8 almost a year ago, Apple has included a new device encryption feature, aimed at securing device data from hackers, thieves, and government agencies, while at the same time removing itself from the equation. After the company was (wrongly) accused of cooperating with the US government's PRISM surveillance program, Apple wanted to ensure that it couldn't be forced to hand over data stored on its customers' devices. In doing so, it gave its customers the encryption keys to their device's data.

How? A simple lock-screen passcode.

The reality is that most iPhones and iPads, running the latest iOS 8 software, are probably already protected. But reports show that about one-third of all smartphone owners have never set a four-digit passcode to lock their phones.

Even if you have a four-digit passcode, it can be manually bypassed in hours (if you found a hacker or government agent who is determined enough). If you set a longer numerical passcode, it greatly reduces the odds of you losing control of your data.

Turning on device encryption is easy. Here's how you do it.

1. Go to your iPhone or iPad's settings

The first step is to gain access to your device settings. Usually, you can find "Settings" on your iPhone or iPad home screen. From there, go to Touch ID & Passcode. (Older devices without a fingerprint scanner will just say "Passcode.")

2. Make sure your passcode is turned on

Once you get into your passcode area, make sure the simple passcode option is turned off. Then, tap the button that says "Turn Passcode On." From here, you will be able to set either a strong four-digit or longer numerical passcode, or alphanumeric password.

3. Set a strong passcode

From this screen, you can set a simple or longer passcode. You have a great deal of flexibility. Remember: the stronger the user passcode is, the stronger the encryption key becomes.

Setting a numerical password is easy: simply type in a memorable passcode of four numbers or longer. Alternatively, you can add letters to your passcode, which significantly improves your device's security. According to Apple, setting a six-digit alphanumeric passcode with lower-case letters and numbers would take about five years to break if every combination was tried.

4. Ensure data protection is enabled

Once your passcode is set, you will return back to the Settings menu. By scrolling down to the bottom of the page, you should see written: "Data protection is enabled." That means your device is now encrypted, and nobody except you can access the data on that device.

Other how-to stories and galleries:

Zack Whittaker is a writer-editor for ZDNet, and sister sites CNET and CBS News. He is based in the New York newsroom. His PGP key is: EB6CEEA5.



Sent via iPad 3

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

Find the IP address of your home router | Computerworld

Find the IP address of your home router | Computerworld

Find the IP address of your home router

In an upcoming blog I expect to write about configuring a home router, which requires logging on to it. This, in turn, requires knowing the IP address of the router. Non-techies typically don't know anything about IP addresses, let alone the one assigned to their router. Since I expect the upcoming blog to be fairly long, I decided to start with this cheat sheet for learning the IP address of a router.

All routers have a web-based interface and, thus, are configured with a web browser. While some routers can be accessed by name (they typically intercept DNS queries), they all can be accessed by their IP address. 

Full access to the router requires a userid and password, but to even get prompted for this, you need to know the IP address. 

An IP address is written as four numbers separated by periods. Typical home networks use IP addresses that start with 192.168. Often the router will have an IP address such as 192.168.1.1 or 192.168.2.1. 

If your Internet Service Provider (ISP) installed your router, they know both its IP address and the userid/password for it. In my experience, the ISP never tells the customer any of this information up front. 

With a self-installed router, you can get the IP address (assuming it wasn't changed at installation) from the manufacturer's documentation. Sometimes it is on a label on the bottom of the router. 

Once a network has been set up, each computing device on the network knows the IP address of the router and will spill the beans if you know the secret handshake. Terminology can get in the way however.  

Apple devices refer to the router as "Router". Windows refers to it as the "Default Gateway", a term borrowed from TCP/IP. Chrome OS refers to the router as "Gateway". Android won't tell you the IP address of your router, forcing you to install an app. 

WINDOWS

Windows users can start a command prompt and type in "ipconfig" to see the Default Gateway. The output will look like this on Windows 7: 

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:

   Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . :

   IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.5.29

   Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.0

   Default Gateway . . . . . . . . : 192.168.5.1

The output of the command Windows XP is almost identical. On either system, if the computer is using Wi-Fi rather than Ethernet, look for "Wireless Network Connection" instead of "Local Area Connection".

The same ipconfig command works on the desktop side of Windows 8, which also identifies the router as "Default Gateway". A wireless connection on Windows 8 is called "Wireless LAN adapter Wi-Fi", while a wired connection is identified as "Ethernet adapter Ethernet".

iOS

On an iOS 6 device, go to settings, then Wi-Fi, then click on the arrow to the right of your network name. You will then see something like that shown below where the router IP address is identified as "Router". 

The instructions for iOS version 5 are identical to those for version 6. 

ios6.routeripcrop2.jpg

On iOS 7 (tested with 7.1.1), go to settings, then Wi-Fi, then click on the name of the wireless network you are connected to. The interface has not changed from version 6, the routers IP address is still identified as "Router" in the DHCP section.  

On iOS 8 (tested with 8.1.2), the procedure is the same as with version 7.

The instructions above assume that the iOS device was assigned its IP address using DHCP. In the rare case where it has a static IP address, click on the Static tab (shown above) and, again, look for "Router".   

OS X

In Snow Leopard, go to Network preferences, click on the Advanced button, then on the TCP/IP tab. As with iOS, the router is identified as "Router". 

In Yosemite you can get the IP address of the router a few ways. 

One approach is a terminal command. Run terminal with Go -> Utilities -> Terminal, then enter: 

  netstat -nr | grep default

The output looks something like 

  Default 192.168.3.1   UGSc   317    2    en0

In this example, the routers IP address is 192.168.3.1. 

Another terminal command you can try is 

  route -n get default

Look for "gateway" on a line by itself. To the right of it is the IP address of the router. 

If using Wi-Fi on Yosemite, Option clicking on the Wi-Fi indicator causes the system to display more data than a normal click. Included in this additional data is the IP address of the router, identified as "Router". Option clicking did not display the router IP address in Lion, I'm not sure which release of OS X introduced it. 

A normal click on the Wi-Fi indicator also produces the router IP address if you look hard enough. Click on Open Network Preferences, then on the Wi-Fi network interface in left side column (should say "connected"), then click the Advanced... button, then the TCP/IP tab and look for "Router". Whew. 

If not using Wi-Fi, then: System Preferences -> Network -> click on the "connected" network interface in the column on the left -> Advanced... button -> TCP/IP tab and look for "Router". 

If that's not enough, the IP address is also available in the System Information utility (Go -> Utilities -> System Information). Click on Network in the left side column, then Wi-Fi in the top pane (not the left pane), and look for "Router" in the IPv4 section.

ANDROID

Android 2.3 and 4.x devices, do not report the router IP address as part of the Wi-Fi settings display. My favorite app for network information is Fing, which I wrote about last year. Fing is designed to take an inventory of the computing devices on your network. Run Fing and click on the top line, the one with the network name. It refers to the router as "Gateway" and the IP address is below the Local Address and above DNS. 

Another great app that shows the IP address of the router as a side benefit is WiFi Analyzer by farproc. In WiFi Analyzer, go to the AP list screen and click on the top line, the one showing the name of the network you are connected to and your IP address. Look for the "Gateway" IP address (it is above the Netmask). 

Update June 28, 2014: As of version 4.4.2, Android still does not report the IP address of the router as part of the Wi-Fi settings display.

Update Nov. 6, 2014:  As of version 4.4.4 still no router IP address. What it does show is the IP address of your device. 

CHROME OS

On a Chromebook, enter "chrome://system" in the address bar and scroll down to network-status. Click on the gray Expand button. If the Chromebook is connected via Ethernet, look for the clump of data identified as "eth0". If you are connected wirelessly, look in the "wlan0" section. The router is identified as "Gateway".

Update June 23, 2014: As of version 35 of Chrome OS the above is still true.

So as not to have go through this again, I suggest writing the IP address of the router, along with the userid/password, on a piece of paper taped to the router face-down. 

Updates
June 23, 2014: There are a couple additional ways to learn the IP address of a router. More and more router manufacturers are offering smartphone apps to manage their routers. Very likely these apps will report the IP address of the router. Another management option for some routers is the website of the router manufacturer.   

June 23, 2014:  Added iOS version 7.

November 6, 2014:  Added OS X Yosemite and a note about Android 4.4.4. 

January 5, 2015:  Updated OS X Yosemite section.

January 7, 2015:  Added iOS version 8.

February 20, 2015: Added a second OS X terminal command. 

Did Google goof with the Flash player in Chrome?

Saturday, May 9, 2015

Applying Federal Law to Support Mandatory Healthcare Coverage

Applying Federal Law to Support Mandatory Coverage

by Elyssa Durant, my.barackobama.com
July 25th 2009 9:59 AM

Underwriting the Social Contract: Distributive Justice & Health Care Reform

The Problem Statement

As health care costs climbed exponentially in the 1980's, so did the cost of health insurance plans. As a result, employers began to enroll their employees in managed care organizations, and many Americans were forced to leave their traditional indemnity type plans. With the advent of the health maintenance organization, there is a financial incentive for the underutilization of care. (Blumstein, 1996; Davis & Shoen, 1996).

In order to reduce financial risk, health insurance companies have restricted enrollment to individuals in poor health. By covering the minimal standards of treatment and excluding high risk groups altogether, major US insurance companies have realized that the health insurance market can a be an extremely profitable industry. The public sector absorbs the cost of unreimbursed care for chronic care in America (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996). Based upon these findings, it seems clear that the money being removed from the health care marketplace is fattening the pockets of CEOs and majority stockholders.

Recent trend towards localized government leaves individuals without a financial safety net. This is the least efficient manner to handle health care costs, and evades the premise that medical care is a natural right in a civilized society. Few Americans feel secure within the current system. The rising costs of medical care contributed to the recent market changes in both the administration and delivery of health services. The financial incentive to cover only the healthiest individuals ignores the fact that medical care is a social good.

Health Insurance Portability Act of 1996

Two years after the Clinton Health Plan was defeated in Congress, Senator Ted Kennedy and Nancy Kassebaum introduced the Kennedy-Kassebaum Bill in response to growing concerns about selective enrollment procedures used by health insurance companies in the private sector. In the final version of the Bill, insurance companies must limit preexisting condition clauses to twelve months. It has been estimated that this provision of the Bill will help an estimated 150,000 Americans obtain health insurance coverage.

There are many levels of the underinsured, including those without any coverage; effective policy must address the needs of the total population without shifting costs from one disadvantaged person to another. Kennedy-Kassebaum fails to address the cost issue—the primary concern for those at risk for losing their health insurance. It does nothing to help the uninsured acquire a decent health policy, and then provides no solution to the critical issue at hand— cost

Since Kennedy-Kassebaum does nothing to control the cost of health insurance and medical care in America, the Bill fails to respond to the issue of greatest concern to the citizens of this country: the cost of medical care. The Bill looks towards the states to develop consumer protections and weakens the regulatory role of the federal government. The majority of the American public is unaware of the fancy footwork involved with this legislation, and the demographics of the population it is intended to protect. In order to assess the utility of this Bill, it is critical to identify the populations at risk for loosing health insurance coverage and the underinsured.

Kassebaum-Kennedy focuses on a slim portion of the uninsured population, and those who would be eligible for COBRA continuation (Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1974). Of the 41 million uninsured Americans, only about 150,000 are expected to benefit from this legislation. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 is really nothing more than smoke and mirrors since it fails to address the true issue at hand—the simple fact that the cost of quality health care in America is becoming a privilege that only the wealthy can afford.

The Cost of Care for Pre-existing Conditions

An individual with high blood pressure may just require prescription medication. Cancer patients in remission may require chemotherapy, and a person suffering with a degenerative disease may be involved in treatment studies. Each condition requires individualized treatment that cannot be based upon the simple economic/cost-benefit analysis used in the utilization review process by large insurance companies. Clearly, the most effective treatment for one patient may not be the best for another. The time required for utilization review may present additional health risks and complications to a patient suffering from a chronic health condition.

Twelve months without insurance coverage may be financially devastating to some patients, and 63% of Americans have already forgone some type of medical treatment within the last year due to financial constraints. Publicity surrounding Kennedy-Kassebaum has hailed the bill as the "be all and end all in progressive legislation, however, in actuality it will only help about 150,000 people.

Recent studies have found that the majority of the uninsured population simply cannot afford to pay the premiums (Donelan et. al., 1996; Hoffman & Rice, 1996). According to their data, only 1% of the Uninsured population is due to current health status and exclusionary preexisting clauses, yet an overwhelming number of insured respondents reported an inability to receive medical care for chronic conditions. The majority of Americans with chronic illness are covered by some type of insurance, yet they are still subject to the utilization review process and access problems that deny or delay medically necessary treatment (Donelan, et. al., Hoffman & Rice, 1996).

Underwriting the Solidarity Principle

Traditional forms of insurance underwriting required that the contract explicitly state which illness or services are not covered by the policy, in advance. If the underwriter did not specifically state a certain condition in the contract, the insurer was held to the terms of the contract and required to pay for services utilized by the policyholder (Stone, 1994, as cited in Durant, 1996).

Increasing numbers of for-profit and non-profit insurance companies began to control costs by refusing to insure individuals who they felt would utilize more services. Insurers began to require health survey status questionnaires (refer to attachment A), and even began implementing AIDS and genetic testing to identify high-risk individuals (Brunetta, as cited in Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). In the 1980s, large insurance companies began including sexual orientation as a high-risk category, by using actuarial sound criteria. Such criteria concluded that gay men were a higher risk for contracting AIDS virus and refused to write policies for anyone believed to be homosexual, (Stone, 1994 as cited in Durant, 1996).

By limiting enrollment to the healthiest members of society, selective enrollment undermines the solidarity principle of health insurance (Davis & Shoen, 1996; Snow, 1996; Stone, 1994). By eliminating those who were suspect of using more services than their healthier counterparts use, insurance companies are able to offer rock bottom prices for young, healthy individuals. By excluding preexisting conditions and requiring certain individuals to purchase high-risk policies, the number of uninsured and underinsured Americans continues to grow exponentially (Durant, 1996).

More individuals are choosing not to purchase insurance simply because they cannot afford it. Even among those with employer based health coverage, the policies frequently exclude coverage for long-term illness or care of chronic conditions (MSNBC News Forum, 1996). Without a standard definition of preexisting conditions, these clauses serve as "wildcards" since they allow insurers to deny coverage for any illness that "manifested itself before the issuing date of the policy (Stone, 1994 as cited in Durant, 1996).

This statement allows insurers to deny treatment for benefits and services for the policyholder for undiagnosed illnesses or conditions of which they were unaware. As a result, the insurers began to demand medical histories of applicants and their families in order to identify high risk individuals (please refer to attachment A).


Legitimacy of Distributive Justice

While there is a legitimate role of government to distribute scarce resources among the nation's neediest individuals, sadly this is not the cause for the mismanagement of medical dollars in the United States today. There is a big distinction between an individual being denied prescription medication at their local pharmacy due to a cost-effective formulary developed by their Managed Care Organizations (MCOs), than an individual being denied a liver transplant because healthy livers are a scarce resource. While both may have equally devastating consequences, it is more difficult to rationalize a lost life based upon rigid cost benefit analysis and utilization decisions made according to formulas and cost-benefit analysis of treatment protocols.

"The political controversy over the distribution of health care in the United States is an instructive problem in distributive justice. Good health is care is necessary for pursuing most other things in life. Yet equal access to health care would require the government to not only redistribute resources from the rich, healthy to the poor, and infirm, but also restrict the freedom of doctors and other health care providers. Such redistributions may be warranted, but to what level, and to what extent?" Gutmann & Thompson (Page 178).

Blendon and his colleagues have reported similar findings in public opinion polls from 1992 and 1994 (Blendon et. al., 1992; Blendon et. al., 1994). A recent study by the American Medical Association found cost to be of paramount concern to an overwhelming number of Americans (Donelan et. aI., 1996). Of the 40 million uninsured Americans, only 1% attributes their failure to acquire health insurance coverage to their preexisting conditions. Among the uninsured, cost is cited as the primary obstacle in obtaining health insurance coverage. Only 1% of the uninsured attributes their lack of coverage to a preexisting condition.

Based upon these democratic principles of distributive justice, consistent opinion polls demonstrate the legitimate role and public desire for government regulation of the health care industry. It has become obvious that the federal government must intervene in order to protect natural law rights, the social contract, and the Constitution of the United States. Regulation is needed to protect the individual freedoms, liberty, and the pursuit of "health, happiness, and the American Dream."

If America is to be the "Land of Opportunity," then clearly individual health and wellness should be an ideal to reach for. Current models of distributive justice emphasize public consensus as a legitimate role for government intervention. According to a number of studies by Blendon and his colleagues, the public has reported an overwhelming general concern about health care in this country, (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996).

State civil courts are backed up with cases where HMOs have violated the First Amendment (gag orders), the Fourteenth Amendment (due process), and the rights of protected classes under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Countless examples of "anecdotal" evidence appear as headlines everyday across the country. (New York Times, 1996; The New York Daily News, 1996; Long Island Newsday, 1996; LA Times, 1996; Picayne Times, 1996; Columbia Spectator, 1996; Columbia University Record, 1996; US News & World Reports, 1996; Newsweek 1996; Healthline, 1996; The Tennessean, 1996; The Albany Times, 1996; The Nashville Scene, 1996). In their entirety, these case reports represent the human tragedy that lies beneath the web of the very worst of American capitalism: corporate greed.

Identifying Populations At-Risk

A study by The Lewison Group in 1996 reveals insight into the private individual health insurance market. Clearly, individuals choosing to purchase health insurance policies for several hundred dollars each month expect their health care needs and expenditures to exceed that amount Regardless of health status, a young healthy 25 year old who purchases an individual health insurance policy can expect to pay well over $300.00 monthly for a health insurance policy with Empire Blue Shield Blue Cross (based upon 1996 rates, current rates available from the New York State Insurance Department).

Since individual policies are not addressed in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPA), an individual policy with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee excludes preexisting conditions for 24 months (enrollment booklet available upon request). The critical markets in need of reform are the adversely selected individual insurance market, and the state's most vulnerable populations: children; the elderly; the chronically ill; the uninsured; and the underinsured.

For the millions of individuals who have lost their employer based coverage, the cost of private health insurance is prohibitively expensive. Many individuals opt out of the individual market and apply for public assistance when the need arises. Those who have retained their health insurance coverage through their employers are being moved into managed care despite their efforts to retain their indemnity style plans (Davis & Shoen, 1996; The Lewison Group, 1996).

Access to Medical Care

As routine practice, HMOs deny or delay care for all services that are not outright medically necessary. Growing numbers of individuals have suffered irreparable harm, and many have died awaiting approval from their HMO's (The New York Times, 1996; Long Island Newsday, 1996; The Tennessean, 1996; Healthline, 1996). It is hardly a secret that HMOs have fallen short of their promise to provide comprehensive health care for the "whole" individual by emphasizing preventative medicine, using medical management to coordinate care. There is substantial evidence that individuals with chronic conditions receive substandard care in HMOs.

A four-year longitudinal study of medical outcomes found that the elderly, the poor, and persons with chronic conditions were in better health when covered by fee-for-service plans compared with a control group covered in HMOs (Ware et. al., 1996). New statistics released in Washington, DC by the American Medical Association and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation revealed the direct costs of individuals with chronic conditions account for 75% of direct medical expenditures in the United States (Hoffman & Rice, 1996; based upon the National Medical Expenditures Survey; raw data available on CD from the Department of Health and Human Services Washington, DC). 45% of the American population suffers from at least one chronic illness.

If managed healthcare has been found to deliver inadequate care to this population, then we are looking at 100 million individuals who are potentially facing personal and financial crisis as they are moved into managed care. The public already accounts for the largest payment of direct medical expenditures, which means the millions of dollars being made by for-profit insurance companies are not being circulated into the economy to assist in public health costs care. The industry made a 14.8% profit in the 3rd quarter of 1996, however these medical dollars were removed from health care and used to fatten the pockets of CEO's and majority stockholders (Healthline, 1996).

Based upon a new report from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the direct costs for persons with chronic conditions represent 69.4% of national expenditures in personal health care (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996). Their direct medical costs are estimated at $4672.00 annually compared with $817.00 annually for individuals with acute illness (Hoffman & Rice, 1996; based upon National Medical Expenditures Survey 1987, not adjusted for inflation). This population is the most vulnerable to complications in their health and with their source of payment. Large insurance companies only provide adequate coverage for acute illness (Donelan et al., 1996; Hoffman et. al, 1996).

Medicaid Managed Care

Following Tennessee's lead, many states have enrolled their medically indigent populations in Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (MCOs). In Daniels v. Wadley, (926 F. Supp. 1305), the court held that TennCare violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since such procedures eliminate fair hearings and independent medical review of disputes. The court found the pattern of routine denials of care by MCOs participating in the states TennCare program to violate the Medicaid Act since it compounded the problem of institutionalized waiting periods for medical appeals pending independent review by the Medical Review Unit (MRU), (42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a)(8)).

Furthermore, the court ordered federal injunctive protection to participants and beneficiaries because no state law may preempt federal law by depriving individuals of their constitutional rights. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was ordered to revise its utilization review procedures for TennCare recipients in keeping with the Medicaid Act (42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a) (8)) ensuring due process protections for all covered beneficiaries by requiring "services are provided with 'reasonable promptness,'" (926 F. Supp. 1305).

This case is one of 543 civil suits pending in the state courts for violations of the Medicaid Act (based upon a Lexis-Nexis search performed December 26, 1996). With the passing of H.R. 3507 into public law, (The Welfare Reform Bill) private citizens will find little reprieve in the federal courts, so any attempts to hold states accountable for violations of federal law will be feeble at best (Denkeret. al., 1996).

Managed care has shown itself to be a farce of "medical management" in light of all the condemning evidence to the contrary. Timothy Icenogle, a medical doctor in the state of Arizona commented in 1981, "We play sort of an advocacy role. I think the public demands something more from physicians than to just be a blob of bureaucrats, and I think we have to take a stand now and then. Our role essentially as patient advocate, is to tell them, well, just because the insurance company is not going to pay, that is not the end of all the resources," (Icenogle, as cited in Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Never has this statement been needed more than it is today. Unfortunately, as more insurance companies refuse to pay for medical treatment, fewer resources become available for patients in desperate need of financial assistance. As Judge Kessler eloquently stated as she handed down her decision in Salazar v. District of Columbia, No. 93-452, December 11, 1996, "behind every fact found herein is a human face and the reality of being poor in the richest nation on earth, (936 F. Supp. Slip op. At 3).

Perhaps most distressing is the lack of accountability for mismanaged healthcare and improper denials of medically necessary treatment. HMOs claim immunity under ERISA, and leaving individuals without recourse in a sea contractual language and lengthy court calendars. It is evident that individuals protected under the Medicaid Act are not fundamentally different from other populations entrapped in the maze of managed care. They are simply those who have "had their day in court."

Due Process Protections

Since all Americans are theoretically entitled to due process protections under the constitution of the United States, it seems the federal courts are long overdue for making such a public statement. We are wasting precious time and losing millions in valuable human resources as we await decisions to be handed down from state courts. The Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to hear New York's request for an ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1985) waiver, making health maintenance organizations liable for medical malpractice in the state of New York.

When HMOs deny care from patients, it is ludicrous to hold individual physicians liable for the utilization decisions made by decentralized corporate review boards. It is time to take a serious look at tort reform, and demand action by the Supreme Court as they approach the date of New York's ERISA hearing. A blanket court ruling upholding Daniels v. Wadley, and Salazar v. District of Columbia is desperately needed to avoid an avalanche of liability suits filed in state courts. The court must uphold Daniels v. Wadley, and Salazar v. District of Columbia if further lives are to be saved in medicine rather than wasted away in the utilization review procedures. While we wait patiently for District of Columbia circuit court to order injunctive relief, the number of individuals suffering irreparable harm due to the systematic denial of medical care grows larger each day.

The history of Medicaid Managed Care does not provide a very optimistic look into the future of TennCare recipients and Medicaid beneficiaries in states around the country. Dating back to the implementation of the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS) in 1981, there are documented cases where "people reportedly died for lack of medical treatment before their eligibility was determined," (Varley, as cited in Gutman & Thompson, I 996). This leaves me to wonder why the states continue to enroll their most vulnerable populations into a system of managed care that has proven to be a disaster.

Perhaps worthy of comment is that Arizona is the only state to have voted Republican in every election since 1948—certainly provides insight into the conservative morale of the state. Although Arizona was the last state to accept the Medicaid cost sharing incentive proposed by the federal government in 1966, it was the first state to force its medically indigent population into managed care in 1981.

Violating Federal Law

Rigid pre-certification requirements and nonspecific utilization review procedures place strategic barriers to access medical treatment and services in Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). Pre-certification requirements are strategic barriers incorporated into the "black box" of utilization review that institutionalizes exclusionary waiting periods and routine denials of medically necessary treatment. According to federal law, "care and services are to be provided in a manner consistent with the simplicity of administration and the best interests of recipients," (42 U.S.C. § I 396a (a) (19)). Clearly, such rigid pre-certification requirements that complicate administrative processing and paperwork on the part of the enrolled beneficiaries is a violation of United States Code.

Furthermore, using primary care providers as a mechanism to limit access to specialists not only complicates administrative processing, but limits enrolled beneficiaries choice of health professionals beyond what is available to the general public in the geographic area (42 U.S.C. § 1 396a (a)(30)(A)). Certainly referral procedures do not "assure that recipients will have their choice of health professionals within the plan to the extent possible and appropriate," (42 U.S.C. § 434.29). Under this provision, it seems that any individual, especially those with chronic health conditions or disabilities should be allowed

Original Page: https://my.barackobama.com/page/community/post/elyssadurant/gGMP3Q


Tuesday, November 11, 2014

Denial of Service: Deconstructed

Denial of Service, Deconstructed

Denial-of-service attacks are an old and crass way to disrupt a network, and yet still are immensely effective. DoS attacks overload the pipes that connect computers to the Internet with massive amounts of legitimate but useless data. DoS attacks create epic traffic jams. The cars in this analogy would be requests for service that hackers send to the target website. Each time the target site gets a request, it must deny it. But because the hacker sends massive numbers of requests from thousands of computers, the target must use nearly all of its time and resources just to deny these requests for service, effectively blocking access to anyone with a legitimate request.

Before that, though, the hacker must create a network of computers big enough to overwhelm the target. They don't buy these computers, they commandeer them. They plant software scripts on systems distributed throughout the world (hence, distributed denial of service, or DDoS). These compromised computers are called zombies, or bots, because they generate attack traffic automatically, without the owners' knowledge.

Hackers create zombies by scanning for exposed systems that they can manipulate remotely. Often these are home and office broadband users. (Lately, existing bot networks have been found scanning for more computers to turn into bots when they're not launching attacks of their own—akin to an army recruiting its soldiers in peacetime. One security consultant said he connected an unsecured computer to the Internet to see what would happen, and it was recruited within three minutes.) Hackers can also insert their attack code through phishing, spyware, viruses and social engineering. Universities have long been popular spots for creating zombies because of the number of easily accessible, unsecured public computers.

With a zombie network in place, the only issue left is scale. The more zombies on a network, and the more aggregate upstream bandwidth they have, the swifter and more severe havoc they can wreak. Several hundred computers could generate 100MB of traffic, enough to knock a small network offline. A 10,000-computer bot network could deliver a 1Gb attack, enough to knock anyone offline who hasn't installed some rudimentary anti-DDoS infrastructure.

Some experts believe that right now different sets of hackers are engaged in an arms race to see who can build the biggest zombie network. Not for bragging rights, but for renting out the networks to anyone who wants to launch an attack, the raw capitalist idea being that the biggest network will generate the best rental business.

Tuesday, Nov. 25, 2003: Running Out of Time

The extortionists' e-mail that arrived on this morning demonstrated that they were losing whatever patience they had: [all typos sic] "I told you that if you try and f*** with us that your site will be down forever.... The excuse that you were in the hospital does not matter to me. So here are your choices: 1) You have until 4pm est today to send us our $40K. 2) You have until 4pm est Wednesday to send us $50K if you can not send the $40K today. 3) You do not pay and your site will be down for 4 days starting Thursday and it will cost you $75K to come back up Monday. 4) You do nothing and do not respond to this email within an hour and we will make sure you are down forever...."

Richardson was panicked. He can't remember precisely when—the entire week has blurred in his memory—but by this time, he had reported the crime to the National Hi-Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) in Scotland Yard. According to an NHTCU spokeswoman, the unit had already opened a similar investigation with a British gaming site called CanBet.

According to Richardson and Lyon, the NHTCU encouraged Richardson to wire two extortion payments of a few thousand dollars each to separate Western Union offices in Eastern Europe. The NHTCU wanted to nab anyone who showed up to take the cash. (NHTCU won't confirm this; the spokeswoman said the unit does not discuss investigative tactics.) Richardson agreed, but for a different reason: He wanted his site back up. "I knew another person [in the industry] who was successful getting back online by sending three or four small payments like this," Richardson says, "and those guys didn't even have a solution to the problem when they paid. I knew Barrett was getting closer and closer to a solution. So I sent the payments, thinking maybe I can get a good week out of this."

But no one took the bait. After about two weeks, Richardson pulled the money back.

Wednesday, Nov. 26, 2003: Barrett's Big Bet

From Sacramento, Lyon instructed the PureGig engineers who would turn on his system 630 miles southeast, in Phoenix. Another 2,400 miles southeast from Phoenix, everyone at BetCris waited impatiently.

Lyon's system intercepted traffic headed for BetCris's servers in Costa Rica, diverted it to his creation in Phoenix, scrubbed off the attack traffic and delivered legitimate traffic back to Costa Rica. It was designed to bar DDoS traffic from touching BetCris. If the system failed, it couldn't defend BetCris, and it wouldn't be able to send legitimate traffic to Costa Rica. But BetCris itself wasn't getting attacked. The system did a lot of other stuff too: monitoring, capacity planning, logging and analysis.

It wasn't perfect. After it was installed, Lyon had to tweak routers on the network, install new versions of software and add capacity to his system. The extortionists kept changing attack vectors, and Lyon and his team kept tweaking. It was a constant battle, but Lyon was confident that the system would enable BetCris.com to stay online. Wilson at PureGig called Lyon's system "ingenious" not because it was unique—it was monitoring and filtering at a proxy location—but because Lyon's monitoring and filtering seemed to stop attacks better than any other effort he'd seen.

But when it was first turned on, the extortionists stuffed too much traffic down its throat. Wilson recalls the math: "We had 100MB links to the DNS servers. We went from handling under 2MB per link to, all of a sudden, 600MB." That's six times a full load. Imagine Fenway Park, which holds about 35,000 people. Now imagine 200,000 people trying to get inside Fenway Park at one time.

The DNS servers were overloaded, and Phoenix got tense.

Costa Rica had been tense for nearly a week (as much as half a million dollars in lost revenue), but now BetCris was bordering on despair. Mickey Richardson lacked sleep, and he struggled to make decisions and lead. His IT staff was fracturing, feeling impotent as they watched the attacks and waited for Lyon. BetCris's small call center staff was getting abused around the clock by customers calling in to vent frustration and demand to know what the heck was going on. The simple task of creating a smart message about what was happening eluded Richardson. "You can't just have your call center staff tell people you were hacked," Richardson says, because it creates more questions than answers.

At the same time, his decision not to pay the extortionists was affecting other wagering sites that shared the same ISP and were experiencing network problems. "I'm getting calls from friendly competitors saying, 'Look, Mickey, we paid. Just pay. We're going down because of you.'"

He was running out of time and energy. Richardson remembers around this time having to update his staff—275 or so people who weren't entirely sure they'd have a job soon—and he couldn't even find words. He thought, "I wish they could read my mind because I'm too exhausted to explain it anymore. I don't have any answers."

In hindsight, Richardson says, he would have spent more time preparing for these human issues attached to the crisis—decision making under pressure, keeping the staff together—and less time worrying about technical defenses. Yes, create those technical defenses and make sure you have a crisis response plan. But also focus more on issues like exhaustion and emotional distress, and how they can be handled.

It was in this context that Richardson received an e-mail, at 11:12 a.m. It caused him to feel, for the first time, "blind fear."

"I would like to thank you for not keeping your end of the deal and making this upcoming weekend an enjoyable one for me." The extortionists demanded $75,000, but then seemed to disregard the money. "I do not care how long I have to destroy your business and I will. You will learn the hard way that you do not make a deal and then f*** around with us.... Let the games begin."

Richardson would soon learn they were not bluffing. They could destroy his business, and they were going to try. For BetCris to survive, Lyon's slapdash system in Phoenix, which was just starting to find its purchase, would have to stand up to the biggest DDoS attack any of them had ever seen.

The DNS servers that had overloaded in Phoenix were brought back online in a couple of hours, after Lyon and Wilson adapted some filtering scripts and increased the size of their network pipes.

Lyon then spent Thanksgiving and Friday eating leftover turkey his girlfriend delivered and tweaking his system to absorb bigger DDoS attacks. On Friday, he believed it could handle a 1Gb attack, and he felt good about that. He assured a frayed Richardson that he'd never see an attack that big. It would take tens of thousands of zombie computers.

Which is exactly what happened. It turns out the extortionists had more than 20,000 zombies. PureGig's data center suffered badly, which affected several of its ISP customers. PureGig decided to take Lyon's system offline to fix it.

"The attack went to 1.5Gb, with bursts up to 3Gb. It wasn't targeted at one thing. It was going to routers, DNS servers, mail servers, websites. It was like a battlefield, where there's an explosion over here, then over there, then it's quiet, then another explosion somewhere else," says Lyon. "They threw everything they had at us. I was just in shock."

Richardson recalls the attack: "So I have Barrett on the line, who I think is the second coming, and he says, 'Let me think about this. Give me some time.' And I say, 'OK, I don't want to pressure you. I have faith. But if you don't fix it, I'm out of business.'"

Why Online Extortion Works

It was never supposed to have gotten to this point; Richardson was supposed to have paid long ago. The extortionists expertly optimized the chances of it.

To ensure a quick, quiet transaction, the extortionists did what all extortionists (in the physical or online world) do: They exploited the problem of the commons. An ecological principle, the problem of the commons states that people will act in self-interest if it profits them in the short term, even if that act will hurt everyone, including themselves, in the long term. Every act, every threat, every negotiation tactic, every single move extortionists make is designed to make paying the protection fee not only appealing, but in fact, the smartest business decision you can make in the short term, even if you know in the long run that you haven't stopped the problem at all.

Thus, extortionists attack when it hurts the target the most; they ask for $10,000 to $100,000 (generally considered the sweet spot of extortionist profitability versus victim willingness to pay, depending on the size of the victim company).

In BetCris's case, the extortionists revealed they were Eastern European, which would make them hard to find, never mind prosecute. Online crime laws are weaker in Eastern Europe than in the United States and the desire to enforce them weaker still (and the FBI wouldn't get involved with offshore gaming sites being extorted from overseas).

The online version of extortion provides unique advantages (relative anonymity, low probability of prosecution, lots of easy targets, diminished chance of physical violence) that have made it a highly lucrative business alternative for bad guys.

BetCris was just another easy target. What the extortionists didn't count on was the unlikely confluence of Richardson's resolve, Lyon's ingenuity and an ISP that would provide them a place to fight back.

Friday, Dec. 12, 2003: BetCris Wins the War of Attrition

The extortionists must have screamed "Hooy na ny!" or some other Russian expletive after their blitzkrieg, when Lyon "got the chemistry down" and managed to absorb the massive amounts of attack traffic and get PureGig and BetCris back up and running. Lyon assumed the bad guys would come back with something bigger, as hard as that was to imagine, so he set out to scale up his system "for whatever was next, a 6Gb attack or something."

But for the next week, the attack stayed steady at around 1Gb. BetCris, Lyon and PureGig had entered a war of attrition. The extortionists would find a way to kick Lyon's system, Lyon and Lebumfacil would tweak it and get back up. Cat and mouse. "Attack, counterattack, back and forth," Lebumfacil says. "It was 24-by-7 monitoring for two weeks." Wilson and PureGig stopped noticing any of this because the attacks had been segregated from PureGig's other traffic.

And then, suddenly, the attacks stopped.

At 8:46 a.m. on Friday, Dec. 12, two weeks after the assault that nearly put him out of business and three weeks after he first read the words "Your site is under attack," Richardson received an e-mail: "Dear Mickey, I tried getting to your site today and I could not. I thought with all the money you spent you would not have these problems anymore. I guess you wasted your money instead of keeping your word. Good luck. P.S. I bet you feel real stupid that you did not keep your word. I figure by now you have lost 5 times what we asked and by the end of the year your decision will cost you more than 20 times what we asked."

Richardson knew this was an admission of defeat, even if it was disguised as braggadocio. His site was up. The extortionists couldn't get to it because they were blocked. He hadn't paid them a dime. They made no more threats. They couldn't because they couldn't back them up with action. The extortionists had lost.

And yet, the e-mail was not far off. Richardson figures it cost him a million dollars in lost revenue and IT investments to win this war. "It was worth it," he says. "I just didn't know it would take a couple years off my life."

"It was amazing we made that system work against that attack," Lyon says. "It was a wake-up call on how good the bad guys had gotten."

And Lyon knows the bad guys have gotten even better since. They've built zombie networks of 35,000 machines, capable of delivering a steady stream of 3Gb traffic. Peter Rendell, CEO of Top Layer Networks, which makes intrusion prevention and anti-DDoS hardware, says he expects botnets to pass 50,000 machines (and 4Gb to 5Gb) by the end of this year. It's an arms race, as defenses scale, then offenses scale, though Lyon is convinced the defenses have far outpaced what extortionists can throw at them.

But the bad guys have a response. Extortionists have encrypted DoS attack scripts and have put them on peer-to-peer networks, making criminals who use them nearly impossible to track or contain. They're registering domains and then attacking those domains, only those domains are redirected to other targets. "The only way to stop that is to delete the domain," Lyon says, "and that's not something you can just do." Lyon stopped an attack but certainly didn't stop the problem.

Still, he wouldn't learn of all this until later, after he decided to start a business and, as he did with Don Best, track down the BetCris extortionists. At that moment, though, after the extortionists admitted defeat, he was ready to relax. He booked a vacation in San Jose, Costa Rica, for New Year's. Finally, he'd meet the people he saved and celebrate with them.

New Year's, 2004: Visit to an Online Gaming Hotbed

Costa Rica is about the size of West Virginia, bookended by Nicaragua to the northwest and Panama to the southeast on the Central American isthmus. With coastlines on both the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea, and mountainous terrain inland, Costa Rica sits along the Ring of Fire, so volcanoes and earthquakes are native. Political strife is not. The CIA calls Costa Rica a "Central American success story."

Lured by its stability, BetCris located there in 1993. Richardson joined as a "utility man" in 1996. Back then, the business wasn't online, it was a call center. BetCris's call center once employed more than 500 operators at peak hours, but the number dwindled as the business moved online. Today, maybe 30 operators will man a call center at peak hours, or during an extortion crisis.

As the Internet took off, so did San Jose as an offshore gaming mecca, for several reasons. The government encouraged the industry to expand its economy. (BetCris supports an industry group to lobby local politicians.) Also, the people are educated, with an excellent work ethic, Richardson says. Costa Rica has a 96 percent literacy rate. More high-level employees at gaming companies are Costa Ricans, including all of BetCris's accounting staff and 90 percent of its managers.

The other reason gaming companies swarmed here is, of course, because it's not the United States, where gambling laws are difficult to negotiate. Today, hundreds of offshore gaming companies, most of them online ventures, operate from San Jose. In BetCris's seven-story headquarters alone, Richardson says, there are 10 such enterprises, two software companies and a telecom company—pretty much offering everything you need to get started in the online gambling business in one building. The competition is mostly friendly. Richardson says it's not unusual to bump into competitors at a restaurant and join them for dinner.

The valley that makes up the San Jose metropolitan area holds almost half the country's 4 million people. Richardson says the valley gets blistering hot, and downtown San Jose is "undesirable." But BetCris, and most of the gaming and tourism industries, are above all that, nestled in the higher elevations of the valley's surrounding mountains, where Richardson compares the weather—and the lifestyle—favorably to San Diego.

When Lyon arrived here, he felt a sense of pride for helping. He saw "this beautiful building with this top-notch data center," he recalls. "And I met all the people who work there, and I kept thinking, I protected all of this. Me and my keyboard helped all these people keep their jobs. It was so neat to see how good a thing it was that we did."

Richardson and Lyon bonded immediately. There was a party with professional-grade fireworks launched from Richardson's front lawn. They went to dinner, talked about life and the attacks. Lyon had developed antipathy to the extortionists; he wanted to nail them. He told Richardson and Lebumfacil he was going to start a business, a service whereby people could subscribe to his anti-DDoS attack infrastructure. Lyon recruited Lebumfacil to help him start DigiDefense. BetCris was his first customer. Richardson gave them office space to start.

That business talk, though, was in the background. Lyon relaxed, went deep-sea fishing and zip-lining through the rain forest.